Abstract-This paper focuses on the pricing decision problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers in which the manufacturer acts as a leader. The price decision models are developed by considering the sensitivity of the retail quantity to the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sale prices of the retailers. The optimal decisions are discussed and analyzed under retailers' different game behavior: Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg. The research indicates that the duopolistic retailers could charge the highest price to customers and gain the greatest profit in the Collusion solution and it is reverse in the Cournot solution, but the leader's profit may be fewer than the follower in the Stackelberg situation
I. INTRODUCTION
An important issue of Supply Chain Management is how the competitive behavior affects the pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain. Many models have been developed on this research. Most of the research paid close attention to the following Stackelberg structure: a manufacture acts as a Stackelberg leader and a retailer acts as a Stackelberg follower. Quantity discount scheme is added into the two-echelon system which is composed with one supplier and one retailer under the manufacturerStg situation in [1] . The two-echelon system is further extended to study with a single supplier and several different buyers when the incremental quantity discount policies are considered in [2] . It is found that the discount policy is impartial to both the supplier and the retailer. Then it is pointed out that a suitable quantity discount scheme could be offered by the manufacturer to the retailer in the manufacturer-Stg process in [3] . It is presented that the scheme benefits the manufacturer. It is studied that different demand affects on the optimal solution in a two-echelon supply chain in the manufacturer-Stg situation. It is confirmed that the profit of manufacturer is the double of the retailer's when a price-versus-demand relationship exists of a two-echelon supply chain in [4] . Other related researches in recent years are in [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
However, most of the literature considered only one single retailer or different independent retailers when the market demand function is linear. Some significant factors are seldom explored, such as the influence from the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sale prices of the retailers, and the situation which retailers play Stackelberg. Thus, it is researched that a supply chain formting of one manufacturer and two retailers in this paper. It is the main objective that the profits are maximized of the manufacturer and retailers on the optimal wholesale price and sale price. The following contents would be fully considered: (i) The retailer's retail quantity is not only related with market demand but sensitive to the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sale prices of the retailers. (ii) Competition of retailers is divided in three situations: Cournot situation, Collusion situation and Stackelberg situation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic profit models are developed of the manufacturer and retailers in section 2. In section 3, the solutions of the models are obtained. In section 4, the optimal policy is analyzed. A conclusion is presented of the whole paper in section 5.
II. BASIC MODEL
In this paper, a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two retailers is considered in which the manufacturer sells a single product to the retailers. The mechanism in two-echelon supply chain assumes the manufacturer as a leader and sets the wholesale prices to the two retailers which is called the manufacturer-Stg process. Then, the two retailers set their retail price and corresponding order quantity independently competing in a common market. The retail quantity is determined by the market demand, the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sale prices of the retailers. For simplification, we ignore the inventory cost and transportation cost of the retailers.
According to the above assumptions, the model is built using the following notation: α is the sensitivity that the wholesale price affects each retail quantity. i β is the sensitivity that the retailer-i's price affects its sales quantity. θ is the substitution degree between retailers, which reflects the impact on customer demand in the retail marketing mix decision. Thus, the retailer-i 's profit and the manufacture's profit could be generated through the following formula
III. SOLUTION OF MODEL
In this section, the above model will be optimized when the retailers compete in different way. The following three situations are mainly focused on.
(1) Cournot situation, i.e., the sale price and quantity are independently set by each retailer merely assuming his competitor's sale price as a parameter.
(2) Collusion situation, i.e., to maximize the downstream retail market's total profit, both retailers are glad to determine their sale prices together.
(3) Stackelberg situation.
A. Optimization of model when the two retailers act in the Cournot situation.
In this subsection, a supply chain is consider when the two retailers act in the Cournot solution. The retailer-i's profit only depends on his sale price when the manufacturer's wholesale unit price is fixed. Then, retailer-i can maximize 
When (4) and (5) is fed into (1), the optimal retail quantities * 1 Q and * 2 Q could be easily obtained. (4)- (5) show the optimal reaction functions of the two duopolistic retailers for any w set by the manufacturer. The retailers' reaction functions can be known by the manufacturer for any w -value that she has set. Hence from (3), 1 R is easily obtained which is the sign of the second-order derivative of M G with respect to w , where
, it is very obviously that 1 R is below zero. It implies that M G is a concave function of w . So the optimal wholesale price set by the manufacturer can be obtained by solving 0
Then the optimal policies and the corresponding profits of the retailers and the manufacturer will be easily yield.
B. Optimization of model when the duopolistic retailers act in the collusion situation.
It is assumed that the retailers want to act in alliance in the interest of maximizing their profit in this subsection. The downstream retail market's total profit is
One can easily obtain the optimal sale prices of the two retailers by solving equations
The optimal order quantities of the two retailers Thus, the profit of manufacturer is
G is a concave function with respect to w . So the optimal wholesale price could be obtained by Solving 0
At last, the optimal pricing policies can be obtained by combining (12) and with (9), (10). And the corresponding profits of the duopolistic retailers and the manufacturer are achieved.
C. Optimization of model when the two retailers act in the Stackelberg situation.
In this subsection, it is supposed that one of the two retailers (e.g., retailer-1) acts as a leader and the other (i.e., retailer-2) acts as the follower in the Stackelberg situation. The following reaction function can be get of Retailer-2 by 0 / 2 2 = dp dG R . From (14),it can be derived that the profit of retailer-1 merely is a function with respect to 1 p and the function is concave. So, the optimal sale price of retailer-1 can be obtained by solving
Then the retailer-2's optimal sale price can be easily determined. The retailers' reaction functions is known by the manufacturer, which is given by (15) and (16) for any set w -value, so the profit of the manufacturer will be
Then 2 R can be obtained which is just contrary to the sign of the second-order derivative of (17) with respect to w , where At last, the optimal pricing policies can be get by combining (19) with (15), (16). Then the two retailers and the manufacturer's maximum profits can be inferred.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS IN THE THREE COMPETITIVE SITUATION
In this section, the optimal solutions are compared which are presented above in three competitive situation. Then we can obtain the following inferences from table 1.
(1) The optimal pricing policy of the manufacturer is not affected by the duopolistic retailers' different game behaviors, but the duopolistic retailers' optimal pricing policies have rather obvious changes.
(2) Among different situations, Collusion can make the duopolistic retailers charge the highest price to customers and gain the greatest profit. Cournot leads to the lowest retail price setting from the duopolistic retailers which earns the lowest profit.
(3) As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer's profit will always be more than that of the duopolistic retailers' in the supply chain.
(4) Facing similar market demand, the duopolistic retailers' action in union is beneficial only to themselves, whereas their non-cooperation will be profitable to the manufacturer.
B. The general case with
This case can be explained that the market demand of the duopolistic retailers is dissimilar. Because the calculation is very complicated, it is difficult to present analytical results. So, in this subsection, three numerical examples will be directly done. In table 2, the assumed parameters are listed. It is described in Example 1 that the retailer-2 has less sensitivity to the wholesale price than retailer-1 and the other parameters have the equal values. It is represented in Example 2 that the retailer-2 has less market demand than retailer-1. It is showed in Example 3 that the retailer-2 has greater sensitivity to his retail price than retailer-1. The numerical results are present in table 3.
From table 3, the following inferences can be observed.
(1) The retailers' different competitive behaviors lead the manufacturer charge different wholesale prices. And the variation of wholesale price mainly depends on the demand and has no regularity.
(2) Among all three kinds of game behaviors that the retailers may choose, the collusion behavior will lead to the highest pricing of the retailer-1 and the lowest pricing of the retailer-2.
(3) Collusion makes the duopolistic retailers charge the highest price to customers and gain the greatest profit.
Cournot results in the lowest retail price and retailers obtain the lowest profit.
(4) In the Stackelberg case, the leader (retailer-1) may not gain greater profit than the follower (retailer-2). The retailer-1's profit is greater than the retailer-1's only when the value of D 1 /β 1 is greater than D 2 /β 2 . This proves that Stackelberg may not benefit the leader. V. CONCLUSION By considering the duopolistic retailers' three kinds of game behavior: Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg, our work further extended the existing two-echelon supply chain models. The manufacturer-retailer supply chain system is composed of one manufacturer and two competitive retailers where the manufacturer leads the two retail followers. Then, the optimal pricing and quantity decisions were discussed under different game behaviors of the duopolistic retailers. The results shows that (i) if act in collusion, the duopolistic retailers should charge higher sale prices than under other situations and it is reverse if the retailers pursue the Cournot solution; (ii) In collusion situation, the duopolistic retailers could archieve the highest profit and it is reverse if the retailers pursue the Cournot solution; (iii) when the duopolistic retailers play Stackelberg game in the downstream market, the leader's profit may not be greater than the follower's, and it may exceed that of the follower's only when the leader's value of D i /β i is greater than that of the follower's.
In this paper, a simplified model of supply chain is studied. However, in practice, there may be several manufacturers and retailers, and the inventory cost and transportation cost should also be considered. These problems may need for further research.
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